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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMP ANY, a Corporation,

P"laintiff,

vs.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH,

Case No.
12823

Defendant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding is upon Writ of Review to review
a decision of the State Tax Commission of Utah, dated
the 7th day of January, 1972, by which it assessed a motor
fuel tax against plaintiff for motor fuel exported from the
State of Utah during the period of January 1, 1968,
through December 21, 1969.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION
On January 7, 1972, the Utah State Tax Commission
made its order assessing a motor fuel excise tax against
taxpayer and ordered the same to be paid totaling in all
the sum of $75,376.59, together with interest in the
amount of $5,252.91 (R. 5, 8, 9).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks a review of the proceedings and for
an order vacating the judgment assessed against it by the
State Tax Commission of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties stipulated to the relevant facts necessary
to determine the above entitled action before the State
Tax Commission, and the Findings of Fact adopted by
the Tax Commission fairly represent the facts of the
instant matter. A summary of the material facts are as '
follows:

1

Taxpayer now is and at all times hereinafter mentioned, has been a licensed distributor of motor fuel (gaso·
line) in the State of Utah (R. 1, 2).
During the period of January 1, 1968, through De·
cember 21, 1969, taxpayer failed to report gallonage of
motor fuel exported from Utah on line 8 of monthly re·
ports filed with the State of Utah on Form TC-109 Rev.,
and to report an equal amount of tax exempt purchases
on line 4 of said reports (R. 2, 6). Through an accounting
inadvertance taxpayer treated such unreported receipts
from Continental Oil Company as Nevada exchange re·
ceipts. This same error was made for twenty-four con·
secutive months (R. 2, 3). The gallonage received on
exchange from Continental Oil Company at Pioneer Pipe·
line TermL.1al, North Salt Lake, and transported to var·
ious bulk plants owned by taxpayer in eastern Nevada ,
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was reported to the Nevada Tax Commission and tax
paid thereon (R. 2, 3). On July 20, 1970, taxpayer filed
a supplemental motor fuel tax return reflecting the gallonage thus received and exported (R. 5).
The Utah State Tax Commission concluded that
Section 41-11-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953, requires
taxpayer to report motor fuel (gasoline) exported from
Utah within 180 days from the date of exportation or become liable for the excise tax to the full extent as if said
motor fuel had been sold in the State of Utah (R. 8).
Taxpayer claims said exports to be exempt under
Section 41-11-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which reads
as follows, to-wit:
"Sec. 41-11-20. Export Sales Exempt. - Said excise tax shall not apply to sales of motor fuel actually exported from this state, and on proof of
actual exportation upon blanks furnished by the
state tax commission and in accordance with the
rules and regulations promulgated by it, the state
tax commission shall, as the case may be, either
collect no tax or refund the amount of tax paid
to the person who paid it on his application made
within 180 days after exportation."
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATUTE, SECTION 41-11-20, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IS CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS.
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Plaintiff submits that Section 41-11-20, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, set forth above, is clear and unambiguous
and provides two alternatives to the Tax Commission in
the case of tax exempt exports - 1., collect no tax, or
2., refund tax previously paid upon application for refund
filed within 180 days from date of export. The 180 day
limitation patently applies only to claims for refund and
Defendant is in error in its interpretation of the statute
that failure to file evidence of export within 180 days
makes the exemption unavailable.
With respect to the use of the word "or", we quote
from 50 American Jurisprudence 267, paragraph 281:
"In its elementary sense, however, the word 'or' as
used in a statute, is a disjunctive particle indicating an alternative. It often connects a series of
words or propositions, presenting a choice of either. '
If the disjunctive conjunction 'or' is used, the various members of the sentence are to be taken separately."
And quoting from the Utah Supreme Court in Ringwood v. State, 8 U. 2d 287, 289, 333 P. 2d 943 (1959):
" ... Focusing attention upon the words purporting

to give the right of revocation, it is to be noted

that the driver is deemed to give his consent to
a chemical test of '* * * his breath, blood,
urine or saliva * * * '. The words being used
in series, the only connective being the disjunctive
'or' it applies to the whole series. Therefore the
ordinary and usual meaning of the language would
be that the subject is deemed to give his consent
to a test of some one of the designated substances,
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or of another, but not all of them. That is, of his
breath, or of his blood, or of his urine or of his
'
saliva."
Quoting from Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Commission, et al., 107 Utah
502, 155 P. 2d 184, 185 (1945):
"We therefore address ourselves to its meaning,
keeping in mind one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction, viz., that the interpretation
must be based on the language used, and that the
court has no power to rewrite a statute to make
it conform to an intention not expressed. 'The legislative intent being plainly expressed, so that the
act read by itself, or in connection with other statutes pertaining to the same subject, is clear, certain and unambiguous, the courts have only the
simple and obvious duty to enforce the law according to its terms. * * * If a legislative enactment violates no constitutional provision or principle, it must be deemed its own sufficient and conclusive evidence of the justice, propriety and policy of its passage.' 2 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory
Construction (2nd Ed.) p. 701."
Here plaintiff has paid no tax on the exports in question in Utah but reported the same to the Nevada Tax
Commission and paid a tax thereon. Plaintiff has, albeit
belatedly, filed with the Defendant Commission proof of
export upon blanks furnished by the state tax commission
and the State of Utah has suffered no damage thereby.
The State of Utah, under the circumstances of the instant
matter, should not be allowed to unjustly enrich itself.
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POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT'S TAX REGULATION
NO. 3 DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
BASIS FOR THE ASSESSMENT.
Section 41-11-16 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953,
provides that the Tax Commission shall administer the
motor fuels (gasoline) tax law and gives the Commission
the power to make and promulgate such reasonable rules
and regulations pertaining to the administration and enforcement of the law as the Commission deems necessary.
Under the powers so granted, the Defendant Tax Commission has adopted various rules pertaining to the administration of the motor fuels tax law. Rule No. 3 pertains to exports. Such rule is quoted in Findings of Fact
(R. 6, 7, 8) and, for the convenience of the Court, is
quoted here:
"Sales of motor fuel, as defined in the motor fuels
(gasoline) tax law (chapter 11, title 41, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended), made by a licensed
distributor in the State of Utah, and actually exported from the state, will be allowed as exempt
sales provided the sale and delivery of the motor
fuel meets with one of the following requirements:
1.

2.

Delivery is made to a point outside the
State of Utah by a common or contract
carrier for a licensed distributor in the
State of Utah;
Delivery is made to a point outside the
State of Utah in a vehicle owned and
operated by a licensed distributor in the
State of Utah;
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3.

4.

Delivery is made at a point in the State
of Utah to a licensed distributor or importer of another state for use or sale in
that state;

Delivery is made, in a drum or similar
container, at a point in the State of Utah
to a person for use in another state.
Each export sale must be supported by records
that will show the following information:
In the case of a licensed distributor, records shall
show date of exportation, consignee or purchaser
and destination of motor fuel. In cases wherein
the exporter is not a licensed distributor, credit
must be claimed through a licensed distributor and
the following requirements must be met:
A. Exporter must furnish Form TC-112
'Proof of Exportation - Motor Fuel'
showing date of exportation, purchaser or
consignee and destination of motor fuel.
B. Licensed distributor shall then make note
of the date this information is furnished
and shall make claim for credit due on
the motor fuel return for the same period
in which the TC-112 'Proof of Exportation-Motor Fuel' was received.
In all cases, claims for credit or refund must be
made within 180 days from date of export, whether
claim is made through a licensed distributor or
directly to the State Tax Commission. All persons
authorized to do so must file claim directly to the
State Tax Commission.
Motor fuel delivered into the fuel tank or auxiliary
fuel tanks of any vehicle owned and/or operated
by a resident of this state or any other state is held
to be taxable." (Emphasis is supplied.)
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That Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein has
been, a licensed distributor of motor fuel in the State of
Utah is admitted. In the case of distributors licensed in
Utah, exports from Utah are reported on Form TC-110
D-1. Form TC-110 D-1 is not even mentioned in the Reg.
ulation No. 3 quoted above and creates an ambiguity and
uncertainty with respect to a licensed exporter exporting
gas for his OWJ1 account. The deliveries of motor fuel
which are the subject of Defendant's assessment were
made by common carrier truck transport from the Pioneer
Pipeline Terminal in North Salt Lake to Plaintiff's bulk
plants located in Eastern Nevada and fall squarely within
the requirements outlined in sub-paragraph 1. of Regula·
tion No. 3.
Plaintiff's records showed the date of exportation,
the consignee or purchaser and the destination of the
motor fuel exported. Again, falling squarely within the
requirements of Regulation No. 3.
L

And in the penultm/ate paragraph of Regulation No.
3 the requirement, " ... claims for credit or refund must
be made within 180 days from date of export, ..."
In our argument under Point I we outline our reason·
ing tending to support our contention that the Statute
provides for a 180 day limitation only in cases where there
is a claim for refund.
Plaintiff submits that the Regulation even more
clearly establishes that the 180 day limitation applies
only to claims for refund and does not support the Tax
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Commission's theory that the exemption is lost unless
exports of motor fuel are reported within 180 days from
exportation.
POINT III.
THE TAX COMMISSION BY ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF REGULATION NO. 3 DELETES THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 41-11-20,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
Those charged with administering the law should not
be allowed to avoid a statutory exemption by an unreasonable interpretation thereof, but should be required to
administer the law in a reasonable manner with a view
to effectuating the Legislative intent.
The Tax Commission by its Regulation No. 3 substitutes the words of the statute, "collect no tax" for "claims
for credit", thus disregarding the substantive portion of
Section 41-11-20 which provides that there will be no excise tax collected on motor fuel exported from the State
and arbitrarily imposes a limitation on the exemption by
making it unavailable if motor fuel exported from the
state is not reported to the Tax Commission within 180
days from exportation.
In Crystal Car Line, et al. v. State Tax Commission,
et al., 110 Utah 426, 174 P. 2d 984, 987 (1946), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
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"The power to tax is purely a legislative function
and unless the legislature has provided for the tax.
ation of the property any attempt to levy and
assess a tax on property is void."
Plaintiff contends that the 180 day limitation sought
to be imposed by the Tax Commission is completely out.
side the boundaries established by the Statute and the
Rule is arbitrary and capricious.
POINT IV.
THE ASSESSMENT AS CONSTITUTING A
PENALTY.
Chapter 11, Title 41, of the Utah Code Annotated
1953, wherein the motor fuels (gasoline) tax law is foun4
provides various penalties for various offenses, but there
is no penalty provided, as such,, for the late reporting of
export sales.
Section 41-11-21 provides that any violation of the
law not otherwise specifically provided for is a misde·
meanor and punishable by a fine of not less than $25 nor
more than $1,000 or imprisonment in the county jail for
not more than 90 days or both.
By the attempted extinguishment of the exemption
allowed, the Tax Commission seeks to levy a penalty o!
100% of the tax involved. This is without legislative
authority and is clearly arbitrary.
As a general proposition it is recognized that penal
statutes should be strictly construed. General Petroleum
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Corporation of California v. Smith, 157 P. 2 356 (Ariz.
1945).

We find no decisions of the Utah Courts on the precise question but in conjunction with various cases involving forfeitures under property tax laws, the Utah
Supreme Court has indicated that statutes providing for
forfeiture of property for non-payment of taxes must be
construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing
authority. See Fivas v. Petersen, 5 U. 2d 280, 300 P. 2d
635 (1956),, and Mecham v. Mel-0-Tone Enterprises,
Inc., 23 U. 2d 403, 464 P. 2d 392 (1970), and various cases
cited.
Plaintiff submits that in the matter at hand, the Tax
Commission, by denying the exemption provided by Sec.
41-11-20 Utah Code Annotated 1953, for a late filing of
a report is imposing a penalty against plaintiff of 100%
of the tax involved without authority of law and, in so
doing, is acting arbitrarily and capriciously.
CONCLUSION
There is no statute or other basis for the Tax Commission's judgment against taxpayer in the amount of
$75,376.59 together with interest in the amount of
$5,252.91. On the contrary, Section 41-11-20, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 and Tax Regulation No. 3 support plain-
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tiff's position that sales of motor fuel made by a licensed
distributor and actually exported from the state are exempt sales and not subject to tax.
The relief prayed for by plaintiff should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN & GUSTIN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

